WebSelect 7 - Truthmakers for modal truths, part 1: possibility. 7 - Truthmakers for modal truths, part 1: possibility pp 83-94. Get access. Check if you have access via personal or … WebJul 28, 2006 · George Molnar, whose paper, ‘Truthmakers for Negative Truths’, we publish here, died on 30 August 1999, eight days after submitting the final version of the paper. …
States of Affairs (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Spring …
WebAn introduction to truthmakers 2. The general theory of truthmaking 3. Epistemology and methodology 4. Properties, relations and states of affairs 5. Negative truths 6. General truths 7. Truthmakers for modal truths: Part 1, possibility 8. Truthmakers for modal truths: Part 2, necessity 9. Numbers and classes 10. Causes, laws and dispositions WebNegative facts would be the truthmakers for negated sentences. Russell (1956) notoriously expresses ambivalence about whether there are negative facts. Armstrong (1997) rejects them, while Beall (2000) defends them. (For more discussion of truthmakers, see Cameron (2024) and the papers in Beebee and Dodd (2005).) 4. Realism and anti-realism 7s 球蛋白
Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology1 Royal Institute of …
WebIn Sect. 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 21 criticise Armstrong's account of truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 31 examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. WebTruthmaking is the metaphysical exploration of the idea that what is true depends upon what exists. Truthmaker theorists argue about what the truthmaking relation involves, which truths require truthmakers, and what those truthmakers are. This Element covers the dominant views on these core issues in truthmaking. WebMar 4, 2006 · Nor do I think we will get very far thinking about truthmakers in the context of difficult issues in the philosophy of time and the question of whether there are … 7s培训试题及答案